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T!JU!Zf\IM< DAVID HEABUlLlN and
1-ii\RC:IL I!LAllLRLIN, his 1vife,

P1aintiffs and
Appellants,

vs.
CITY Of FUN CARNIVAL, a
partnership and LOUIS
MELENJJLZ,

Case No. IS,214

Defendants and
Respondents,

vs.
LOIS HHE.NDLZ,
Third Party
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
The determination of the tern's of partnership
agreement, an accounting between the partners and the
dissolution and winding up of the affairs of the partnership.
DISPOSITION IN TilE LOWER COURT
A brief trial was held after the court's denial
of Respondents
trial,

1

two Jliotions for Summary Judgment.

At the

the lo1ver court ruled there was a partnership, denied
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respondents

1

counterclaiitt for money j udgn:ent on alleged

promissory notes clue responclents froJtt appellants, orcll·reJ
an accounting be maclc bct1vecn the pa1 tners anJ
be selected for this purpose;
specific order
done.

~or

th<~t

a referee

that the court 1vould issue a

the referee to act within.

This was not

Appellant prepared and submitted a proposed order

for this purpose.

Respondents then filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment for the third time.

Lower court then

reversecl itself and granted respondents

1

Motion for Summary

Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants pray this court reverse the
judgments of the trial court;

to determine terms of the

partnership agreement of the parties and to order an accounting and the winding up of the affairs of the partnership on
the basis of the partnership agreement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the Spring of 1964, appellants entered into
an oral partnership agreement with respondent Lou Melenclez
who operated a traveling carnival known as the City of Fun
Carnival.

(Dave lleaberlin Deposition, Page 8, Lines 4-12;

Margie Heaberlin Deposition, Page 9, Lines 1-9)

Pursuant to

said agreement, appellants were to have 50% s',are of the
profits and losses of the business and were to have the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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primary rcsponsihilitr of

J<~aintcnance,

repair, set-up, take-

Jcnm, clean up and moving all of the carnival equipment and

suppLies.

kespondent Lou !llelendcz was responsible for the

"paper \VOrk", receipts, d.isbursen:ents and the handling of
the JIIOHey.

(llayd lleaberlin Deposition, Page 12, Lines 17-18,

Lines 24-25;
Line 10;

Page 13, Line l;

Page 47, Lines 5-16;

Page 44, Line 8 to Page 45,
Page 57,.Lines 9-21)

Pursuant

to this oral agreement, the business was operated by the
partners on a S0-50 basis, both partners performing their
primary responsibilities as agreed upon and as above described.
The facts arc uncontroverted that respondent Lou Melendez
prepared and filed U. S. Partnership Income Tax Returns for
the years 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969;

said Federal Partnership

Income Tax Returns reflected equal ownership between appellant
David lleaberlin and respondent Lou Melendez and reflected a
financial statement and balance sheet of the partnership
illustrating capital accounts and net worth of both partners;
and further illustrating equal division of the profits of
the partnership.

(Deposition Louis Melendez, Jr., Page 32,

Line 7 to Page 33, Line 10;
1972, Po.int

VI,

Plaintiff's Memorandum June 16,

Page 3, Lines 21-28)

Appellant Dave lleaberlin

and respondent Lou Melendez both signed and executed installTdent contracts, doing business as City of Fun Carnival.

(Dave

lieaberlin Deposition, Page 49, Lines 21 to Page 53, Line 20;
Page 54, Lines 12-25)

One parcel of land located in Pleasant

Grove, Utah County, State of Utah, was taken into the name
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated

of appellant Dave lleaberlin and respondent Lou

~lelendez

and

the title to said land is still held in both names as partners.
Several vehicles, trailers and tractors were taken into the
~lelcnclez.

names of appellant Dave lleaberlin and respondent Lou

Copies of these. registration documents were attached to
appellants

1

-pleadings in opposition to respondents

1

several

motions for summary judgment and are a part of the pleadings.
Respondent Lou Melendez retained a majority of the earnings
of the partnership in the business for the purpose of
increasing the assets of the partnership and just minimal
salaries were distributed on an equal basis to appellants and
respondents.

The financial statements of the partnership

reflect a substantial accumulation of net worth in the partnership business and the capital accounts of the partners.

In

January, 1965, respondent Lou Melendez contemplated incorporating the partnership business known as City of Fun Carnival.
On about February 1, 1965, respondents prepared and presented
to appellants for their signature a pre-incorporation agreement.

Appellants did not understand the proposed pre-

incorporation agreement and refused to sign.
Deposition, Page 10, Lines 12-23;

(Dave Heaberlin

Page 40, Lines 10-24;

Respondent Lou Melendez Deposition, Exhibit 1)

Respondents

continued to urge appellants to sign the document and
represented to thern that it was to facilitate business dealings
with third parties and would not effect the existing or future
rights of appellants.

Based upon this representation,
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-4-

:tJ'!'cllant:; signed sa.id proposed prc-incoqJoration agreement
on

;_~bouL

fljc'Lil 18, 19(>7.

(Dave llcabcrlln Deposition, l'at;e

JO, Li.ne 12 to Page JJ, Line 6;

28, Line 30;

Page 25, Line 21 to Page

Page 61, Lines 3-19;

Exhibit l)

Exhibit 1 of

Lou l·iclenclez 's _Deposition provided as follows:
"This agreement intered into on the lst
of ~ebruary 1965 and to be tetroactive
to January 2, 1965 is for sale of 45%
of stock of City of Fun Carnival by
Lou Melendez to Dave Heaberlin for the
sum of $25,000.00 plus $5,000.00 to
cover outstanding personal loans
aqulrecl by Lou Melendez for the business.
The sale is for the operating corporation,
City of Fun Carnival Inc., and to purchase 45% of the Lou Melendez Inc. holding Corporation. The sale is for portable
carnival equipment only and for no other
Lou Melendez interests or investments
unless agreed to in writing. The sale
is mainly for help in operating the
carnival unit as no additional new cash
is involved. Therefore if conditions
become where this is impossible the
sale is of no value and may be terminated.
l.

Dave is to work at least ll months
every year in helping to operate
and maintain carnival equipment.

2.

Purchasing of shares is for portable
carnival equipment only and in no
other of Lou's property or interest
unless in writing.

3.

Complete inventory is to be taken
of all Dave's equipment and credit
given to him as to cost value. He
must declare his personal inventory.

4.

Daves salary is to be from a "one"
ball game, his wife is to operate
unless changed by agreement of
mutual consent. Ball game is to
be operated when approved by Lou in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-5Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

accordance to fair contracto; and
!Jrivilage paid.
4A.

Daves salary is at all times
paid in full by "une" ball
game receipts.
At no tit'te will
wages be in arrears.

4B.

Dividends may be given when Lou
feels necessary and appropriate
by surplus.
Dividends are to
be paid according to stock
holdings.

5.

bave is to at all time conform with
the policies set up by Lou, especially
of no fighting, drinking or unbusiness
like conduct.
He is to reveal to no
one the business transactions between
Lou and Dave.

6.

The assets are at all times to be in
the name of Lou and the show will at
all times do business through Lou
and by him.
Lou's decisions at all
times will be final.

7.

The home of business will be in
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and as directed
by Lou.
Winter quarters will be in
Utah unless directed otherwise by
Lou.

8.

The sale of 45% of show stock to
Dave is to be $25,000.00 plus
$5,000.00 for additional bills made
personally by Lou to personal friends
and to be repaid by him, namely
Robert Melendez, Sam Soccoli, and
iJamediate family in-laws, etc,
amount not to be more than $5,000.00
no interest attached.

9.

In case Dave ever wants to leave
or is bought out, it may be done by
giving one months notice and he
agrees to never work or have dealings
in the area this carnival has ever
showed with him, for S years to come.
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10.

JJavc, if he cl ects to leave the firm
i l l n c v e r b c all o II' c d to 1 eave with
any piece of property except fur the
inventory he filed at begining of
agreclllent and any added to list by
Lou bought personally by Dave - all
additions arc to be signed for by Lou.

IV

ll.·

All equipment bought will be with
company funds for the company.

12.

As carnival is efficient only in
size at no time will the unit ever
be divided for clisolvement of partnership.

13.

Dave will be paid, in case of disolvement, price agreed upon or by amount
of stock paid into corporation by him
and in no case more than the $25,000.00
agreed purchase price and in san,e time
period as paid for unless otherwise
agreed upon.

14.

This partnership can be dissolved by
Lou in case of Dave's failure to live
up to Lou's policies and in case of
disagreements between parties by using
#13 as basis.

15.

Each party is to help form an efficient
portable carnival to the best of their
abilities. Dave is to have no other
interest except in the fulfillment of
this contract.

16.

Upon Dave's payment of $25,000.00
for 45% of City of Fun Inc. for $1.00
he may exercise the option to buy 45%
of Lou Nelendez Inc. holding corpora
tion of the carnival equipment.

17.

Dave is to pay $1,250.00 per year to
Lou from summer earnings given from
declared dividend, if business is
financially able to and by majority
stockholders vote. Five thousand
dollars is to be paid as quickly as
possible but never faster than sound
judgement by Lou. Interest of 8% on
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stock payments arc' to be made only if
in arrears. J>ayn:cn ts and all account
ing is to be as of January 1, 1'16S for
all practical purposes.
lf more tl· •n
$1,250.00 yearly dividend is decla· d
at least 75% of Dave's share liiUSt J,,,
il!Jplied tol>arus stock payments unt iJ
full amount is paid.
18.

This contract becomes void and collectable as to recourse in case of
Dave's absence of longer than two
months or for 1 week in time of
operations.

19.

At no time will Dave be able to sell
his interest to any party outside of
Lou unless by inhertance to his wife
only, and then no further unless
approved by Lou in exercise of #13 by
Lou to Dave and his wife's estate by
their death.

20.

The main point in selling the 45% to
Dave is for his assistance in maintaining good quality maintenance on
show and moving the unit efficiently.

21.

A $50,000.00 Life Insurance policy
will be carried as of January 1, 1967
on Lou Melendez and paid for by the
City of Fun. Holder is to be company
for the sole purpose of buying out
Lou's share of portable carnival
equipment and to sell to Dave Heaberlin.
Equipment includes everything portable
except personal items. Truck, car,
trailer house, etc. Upon transfer of
shares the balance due of Dave
Heaberlin's original 45% purchase
become a first mortgage on show.
After five years from date of corporation agreement this clause may be
re-negoia ted January 1, 1966."

Exhibit 1 above was further evidenced by six stock
subscription promissory notes in the amount of $5,000.00 each.
Respondent Melendez 1;as to control the payment of the c,aid
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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:;tocL :;u!J.~cti]>Liun note~; out of proceed~ of the business as
respurrJc·nt i•leleJlllc::.,

in his judgment, h'ould determine that the

r.itllclritt•al ol said J.~OllC)' would not hurt the busjness.

(Dave

!lenl>erlin IJejJo:;itjon, Page 12, Line 19 to Page 13, Line 2;
Page: 27, Line 21 to ]'age 30, Line 15;

Sec Lxhibit l, paragraphs

41i anJ paragraph 17)
After Exhibit 1 was signed,. the business continued
to operate as it !tad originally on a SO% division of profits
and losses and the same responsibilities as prior to said preincorporation agreement;

respondents divided minir.tal salaries

equall)' after said date and reinvested to excess profits back
into the business.

(Dave Heaberlin Deposition, Page 34, Line

24 to Page 36, Line 11)

This created capital accounts of the

partners in excess of $200,000.00 each for appellants and
respondents.
The proposed corporation was never formed, no
stock was issued, the stock subscription notes Here never
cancelled by the respondents and respondents never made any
clelilands for payJ;tent on said stock subscription notes until
appellants commenced this action.

Parties mutually terminated

the pi.trtnership and appellants left the City of fun Carnival

I

on or ohout l·lay 21), 1970, after an argwnent provoked by anc.l
lv.ith respondents herein.
Line

C)

(Dave Heaberlin Deposition, Page 16,

to !'age 17, Line 2 5)
On February 9, 1971, Judge Joseph E. Nelson, the

originitl tri.al judge, signed an Order which states as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"lt js hereby ordered that the defendant
~le.lcnclcz, Jr. be ~md the s;Jnte is
hereby enjoined and restLlined ftom incurrjng any debts or obligaLiono-, <tg: in:,t the
assets of the City of Fun Carni1 ·1 Juring
the penclency of this action ancl Uit t i 1
further hearing and orcler of this court.
The court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for the
appointment of a receiver at this time and
directs that this matter be placed on the
trial calendar to he tried Oll its merits
at the earliest convenient trial setting.
The court denied the balanc6 of plaintiffs'
Motion except for the injunction concerning
the incurring of additional indebtedness
as hereinabove stated."
Loui~

I

Contrary to this Order and without any subsequent
order modifying the same, respondents encumbered the partnership assets with an SBA loan.
At the time of the mutual termination of the
business by the partners, respondents had in their possession
an automobile for their partnership transportation and a
housetrailer in which they lived.

The automobile and the

housetrailer was later repossessed at the instance of the
resp0ndents herein.
Appellants commenced this action to compel
respondents to account for the assets of the partnership,
to distribute the same and wind up the affairs of the
partnership;

all after respondents refused to do so on

request.
On April 28, 1972, responclents flied a

~lotion

for Summary Juclgment regarding partnership agrecPten t of the
parties.

On July 29, 1972, the above cntitlccl court denied
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rc~Iwndcnts'

~lotion

fo1· Summary Judgment.

On November 3,

1972, trial court l~sued a Pre-Trial Order bifarcating the
ic;sucs for trial;

first trlal relating to the partnership

agreement and its effects of dissolution;

the second issue

referred to trial for an accounting between the former
partners.

On January 17, 1973, the trial court reversed

itself and ruled that Exhibit 1 herein, ihe pre-incorporated
agreement was the partnership agreement of the parties and
that the only remaining issue was that of accounting among
the former partners.

Appellants' Motion for reconsideration

and new trial on said issue was denied.

On July 12, 1973,

the trla1 court granted respondents' motion for protective
order denying appellants the opportunity to discover the
details of the SBA loan made by respondents upon the property
of the partnership and contrary to Judge Nelson's previous
order.

Again on April 18, 1973, the trial court denied

respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment for the second time.
On February 6, 1974, the above entitled court made and
entered a minute entry which provided in part as follows:
"It is the order of the court that an
accountant must be appointed to decide
this matter or as an alternative the
court will arrange to have Judge
Harding hear the matter on its merits,
with the losing party to bear the costs.
The attorneys to make their own arrangements for a reporter."
" .... Upon request of both counsel and their
clients the court hereby appoints Mr. Verlan
Anderson to act as an accountant on the above
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-11OCR, may contain errors.

matter.
The court to Jii<Jkc a de taj .I eel
order and sulJJ:,it S;JJ;le to ~lr. Tay1cJJ
andMr. Le~Vio;."
The tr.ial court did not prcpan· such a dcLJilcd
order before the referee:.

Counsel for appc:l]ants prcparcd

and submitted to the court a proposed detailed order for
this purpose.

Upon a third motion for summary judgment J:,aclc

by respondents, the trial court on April 15, 1977, entered
an Order and Judgment granting respondents' n.otion for
summary judgment in all respects and. ordering that all of
the property of the partnership belonged to respondents.

The

same )>Cnuine issues of controverted facts existed all through
the Ir:otions and orders of the trial court, Hi thout the facts
challging in auy respect.
The pleadings \-Ji th respect to the above motion
reflects the controverted facts of genuine issues to be tried.

ARGU~!EN'J'

POINT I
TilE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT lNG SUMJILI\RY JUDGMENT
TO RESPONDENTS ON TE~lS OF PARTNERSHIP AC;REUlENT, TllLl~E 1\UNG
TilE FOLLOWING CONTROVERTED GENUINE ISSULS OF MATERIAL FACTS:
A.

WAS THERE AN OEAL PARTNERS!liP AGREUiENT BLT!VLEN

ThE PARTIES.
B.
DID A PURPORTLD PRE -lNC:ORPOHATION AGREEMENT
1-iODIFY HlE OEAL PARTNERSHIP AGRLE~lENT?

(a)
WAS TliERI: ADEQUATL CONSlDLl\'\TION FOF Till:
PURPORTED AGRELNENT?
(b)

nlElU:FURE

\\AS THL !lOCUJ\ILI\T Ui\lUI\SC:IO:,fdol.L Ai\!J
li~HcNFOHCLJ\flLL?
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(c)

UI'UN BY
C:.

h"\S l'J LVLJZ PUT INTO FORCL AND .1\CTL!J
'Jffl: 1'1\IZTIES?

\il!J\T \IJ:!ZL TliL TLR0IS Of TliE 1'.1\IZTNERSHIP AGREEi'iENT?

l~lc

56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

pro\·ide that summary judgment may be granted only if there
is

Il_l)__~_!llLLnc

~lcGovern,

.i.ssue as to any material fact.

In Rich vs.

Utah, 1976, 551 P2d 1266, this court rules as

follows:
"lnasmuch as the party moved against is
being defeated without the privilege of
a trial, the court should carefully
scrutinize the 'submissions' and contentions he makes thereon to see if his
contentions and proposals as to proof
of material facts, if resolved in his
favor, would entitle him to prevail;
and it so appears, the motion for
summary judgment should be denied and
a trial should be had ..... ,"
In the case now pending before this court there
is and was several controverted genuine issues of fact.
A.

Was There An Oral Partnership Agreement

Between The Parties? - The depositions of witnesses and the
parties clearly disclose that an oral partnership was formed,
assets were acquired in the partnership names of appellants
and respondents, U. S. Tax Returns filed and prepared by
respondents disclosing a partnership between the parties,
their equal interest therein and balance sheet disclosing
some of the assets of the partnership.

The court originally

ruled there was a partnership and ordered an accounting.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Did 1\ Purported Pre: Incorporation Agree~

B.

Modify The Oral Partnership Agreement? (a)

\\'as There .i\clequate Consideration For

The Purported Agreement? - The depositions of appellants ancl
respondents

ful~y

disclose that the proposed pre-incorporation

agreement was lvithout any new or additional consideration.
There is no evidence before the court in-the form of motions
or otherwise disclosing consideration for this

pre-incorporati~

agreement which was never acted upon between the parties.

At

the time the parties signed the pre-incorporation agreement
they already had a partnership providing for equal rights in
the business.

(Dave Heaberlin Deposition, Page 8, Line 13 to

Page 9, Line 24)

Although entirely oral, this agreement was

contracted in the presence of witnesses and was supported
by more than adequate consideration, both parties furnishing
equipment and promising to perform services.

(Deposition

Dave Heaberlin, Page 30, Line 10 to Page 33, Line 25;

Page 45,

Lines 11 to Page 47, Line 4)
To be a valid modification of the prior agreement,
the new agreement must have been supported by new consideration.

See 17 fun Jur. 2nd, Contracts Section 460.

See also

P.L.C. Landscape Construction vs. Piccadilly Fish and Chips
Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P2d 562 (1972).

A close examination

of the pre-incorporation agreement reveals there is no new
consideration whatsoever.
bxhibit 1)

(See respondent Melendez deposition,

The document itself recites that "no additional
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ncl'. ca:;lt is jnvolvcd".
crock never issued.

The corporation ,,·as never forr.1ecl and

J\ppl'll ants' only course of income during

the pel iod of the p:1rtners!tip
~Vh.iclJ

\•I:JS

the profits of the business,

v.ere disbursed solely by respondent Lou illelendez.

(Depoc;ition !lave lieaberlin, Page 44, Line 8 to Page 45, Line
10;

Page 47, Line S to Page 48, Line 24)

It was entirely

with respondents' power to withhold profits and not credit
appellant with his share and thus deprive appellant of the
ability to pay for any such proposed stock.
The respondents' only unconditionally promise was
to "help form an efficient, portable carnival to the best of
(his) aLiliti.es" which ,,-as an i"'plied covenant under the
original oral partnership agreement and thus is not due
consideration.
(b)

Was The Document Unconscionable and

1berefore Unenforceable? -

The facts clearly disclose that

the respondents herein retained the power to withhold profits
fro111 appell:mts herein, and not enable the appellants herein
to pay for any stock in the proposed corporation that was
never formed.
itself.

This is expressly provided in the document

(See paragraphs 4B and 17 of Exhibit 1 to Respondent

Melendez's Deposition)

The intent of the parties is confirmed

by the deposition of ])ave Heaberlin (page 45, Lines 17-25)

and respondents' conduct confirms it.

(Deposition Dave

lieaberlin, Page 12, Line 19 to Page 12, Line 2;

Page 28,

Lines 2 J to Page 29, Line 2)
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(c)

l\'as It Lvcr Put Into Force And Acted

Upon By The Parties?-

The facb

fully disclose that the

corporation was never formed and no stock \\'as cveT sold or
delivered.
23;

(Deposition Dave lleaberlin, Page 42, Lines

Page 53, Line 21 to Page 54, Line 3)

Both parties drew

substantially equal amounts for living expenses o£ general
receipts and the balance o£ the profits of the business was
retained by the respondent in the business of the parties.
(Deposition Margie Heaberlin, Page 22, Line 17 to Page 21,
Line 6;

Page 44, Line 11 to Page 45, Line 17;

Deposition

Dave Heaberlin, Page 34, Line 22 to Page 35, Line 13;
48, Lines 5-24)

Page

In addition the respondent prepared and

filed U.S. Partnership Returns for the years 1966, 1967, 1968
and 1969, reporting the income as divided equally between the
parties and said returns being filed after the purported preincorporation agreement.

(Deposition Lou Melendez, Jr.,

Page 32, Line 7 to Page 33, Line 12)
When parties make a contract and subsequently
act in a manner

inconsistent with its continued existence,

this raises a question of fact as to whether they have
abandoned it or rescinded it.
285 P2d 114;

King vs. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419,

Green vs. Garn, 11 Utah 2d 375, 359 P2d 1050.

The facts disclose that the parties at all times acted in a
manner inconsistent 1vi th the purported pre-incorporation
agreement and continued to conform theiT conduct to the terms
of their original oral agreement.
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C.
0_;_!::_~':::_11_1_("1_1_1:_7

hhat Were The Terms Of The Partnership

- There is and has a genuine issue of material

controverted fact as to the terms of the partnership agree!ltC!lt.

Dcpositj.ons of witnesses and parties raised the

issues as to what the terms of the partnership agreement
were and the conduct of the parties disclosed what the
terms of the partnership was.

The evidence disclosed a

50-50 partnership.

POINT II
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS 1
TO ALTER TflE JUDGMENT ENTERED At\ID FOR NE\\' TRIAL.

~lOTION

The record is repleat with genuine issues of
controverted facts which the court summarily dismissed on
as inconsistent basis and reversing itself in the process;
all of the facts being the same through all presentations
and at a time when the court had heard no evidence from the
hitnesses involved and permitting the same issues to be
relitigated in the forms of motions for summary judgment,
genuine controverted facts remaining the same at all times.
The court expressly provided in its minute entry of February
6, 1974, that the trial court would make a detailed order
and submit the same to counsel;

this was not done and

counsel for appellants submitted such an order for the court
in conformance with the court's previous ruling, which the
trial court refused.
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I'OJNT l J I
TRIAL COURT LJWLD II\ GRN(J J;~c; SlJ.\J,'.L\FY JUT1C~IL\T
ON ISSUf.S OF REQUEST !'OR J\CCOUNTII\G;
lllLRL l\Lli~C CJ f\<lllNL
ISSUES OF ~~TERIAL fACTS ON:

J\.
THE LO\I'ER CLIURT RULLD Tli!IT TIILRJ: ll'i\S
PARTNL:l\SlliP J\ND OJWERLD AN J\CCOUNTING.

1\

B.

WJ-(AT \VJ\S TilE VALUE OF TilL PARTNERS!liP'?

C.

\\'HAT WElZE TilE TERlliS OF TilE DISSOLUTION?

A.

The Lower Court Ruled That There \\'as A

Partnership and ordered an

accountin~.

- The trial court

expressly ruled that there was an issue of an accounting and
ordered an accounting made on February 6, 1974.

The court

failed to provide a detailed order, counsel for appellants
did so but the court refused the same and granted respondents
summary judgment on the issue.
B.

\\'hat ll'as The Value Of The Partnership? - Then

are financial statements indicating what the equity of the
partners are in the business and show a substantial increase
in value of the assets, that all of the assets are not disclosed in the financial statement and that at this point in
time respondents are wrongfully being allowed to retain all of
the retained earnings that he held in the coJ11pany after forcin:;
appellants out.
C.

What Were The Terms Of The Dissolution? - The

law has specific remedy for dissolution where the parties do
not agree as to the terms and conditions of a d is,;olution.
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purpurtc'd pre-incorporation agreement that 1,as never acted
upon did not replace the original oral partnership agreement;
the laws of the State of Utah expressly provide for the terms
and conditions for dissolution of the partnership and the
accounting and distribution of assets.

This is the relief

that this appellant has been seeking since the case was
oribinally commenced.

POINT IV
TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL DENIAL OF RESPONDENTS'
/.JOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DETERMINING CONCLUSIVE FACTS
THAT ~lADE SUBSEQUENT MOTIONS FOR SUMMAJ<Y JUDGMENT BY
RESPONDENTS MUTE.

Rule 56(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary
Judgment, expressly provides that where a case is not fully
adjudicated on motion, that facts specified in the order
shall be deemed established and the trial shall be conducted
accordingly.

The trial court's establishment of the fact

that there was a partnership and ordered an accounting
established those facts and that respondents last Motion for
Summary Judgment, erroneously granted by the lower court, had
no effect as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
Parties herein formed a partnership under an
oral agreement in which both parties shared on an equal basis.
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They 1vorked under this oral agrce1:1cnt for G ycctrs duriJtg 11hic1t
time su!Jstantial cap.i tal
capital accounts.

~Vas

earned and retaincJ in the partner,

The Pre-Incorporation

never put into force by the parties,

i\grecJ~:cnt

in 1CJCi7 1, 35

there was no cons icleratio 11

for it and its enforcement is unconscionabJe.
mutua.lly terminated the partnership in 1970.

These partie:;
There are

multiple genuine issues of material facts that prohibit the
granting of Summary Judgment as was done by the lo1ver court.
The effect of the trial court's ruling is to create an
unconsc.ionab lc forfeiture of capital accounts of appellants
of a sum in excess of $200,000.00.

The lower court erred in

granting Summary Judgment and in reversing itself on several
occasions.
Respectfully submitted,

17'/1
0~
~?,--~~~~~
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR ,, MOODY
Attorneys for Appellants
55 Last Center Street
Provo, Utah
84601
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